Gaming the Party Nomination: How Incumbents Strategically Time Retirement Announcements to Favor Dynastic Successors

Speaker: Prof Naofumi Fujimura

Prof Naofumi Fujimura (Kobe University)

Professor Naofumi Fujimura is an expert in comparative politics, specializing in legislative politics, Japanese politics, and political parties. His research investigates the role of political  institutions, such as legislatures and political parties, in shaping the dynamics of representation, resource allocation, and political participation. Currently, Professor Fujimura is engaged in cutting-edge research projects examining dynastic politicians, party unity, and electoral manipulations. His work has been published in leading academic journals, including Political Science Research and Methods, Legislative Studies Quarterly, Party Politics, and European Political Science Review.

Abstract:

Political dynasties, the succession of political offices by family members, are a common phenomenon around the world, and pose a threat to democracy. How do political dynasties arise and persist in democracies? Previous studies have found that political dynasties persist because dynastic candidates have a higher probability of winning elections by inheriting electoral resources from their family members. However, little is known about how dynastic candidates are successfully nominated by political parties, even though party nomination is essential for electoral success and thus competitive. Using an original dataset from Japan, this study finds that incumbents who want their family members to inherit their seat strategically delay announcing their retirement until closer to an election to prevent their party from recruiting new candidates widely and other candidates from preparing electoral campaigns, thereby forcing their party to nominate their family members who can launch electoral campaigns quickly by inheriting their electoral resources.

Date：13/11/2024（Wednesday）

Time：16：00-17：30

Venue：E21B-G002

Language: English